Summary. This paper illustrates the application of functional equations results in population ethics. In an intertemporal framework, we provide characterizations of several classes of variablepopulation social orderings that may depend on individual lengths of life in addition to lifetime utilities. The generalized associativity equation turns out to play a major role in proving the results of this paper and in mathematical approaches to population ethics in general.
Introduction
Solutions to functional equations have become important tools in an increasing number of problems in social sciences such as economics and psychology (see Aczél [2] for a discussion of various applications). Traditionally, issues involving social evaluation with a variable population have been analyzed mainly in a philosophical context -specifically, they have been a subject of investigation in ethics. Recently, formal social-choice theory has been applied to population problems, and mathematical techniques have become increasingly important. In this paper, we illustrate the use of the analysis of functional equations in population ethics.
Suppose a social ordering is used to rank different states of the world that may involve different populations and different population sizes, and intertemporal aspects are explicitly taken into consideration. We assume that, for each possible state of the world, the set of individuals alive, their birth dates, lengths of life, and lifetime utilities are known. Utilities are normalized so that a utility level of zero represents a neutral life -a life that is neither better nor worse than its alternative. These normalized utilities are assumed to be interpersonally comparable and numerically significant indicators of lifetime well-being.
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In Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [3], we analyzed the consequences of a separability axiom that requires social evaluations in the present to be independent of the well-being of individuals whose lives are over in the states of the world to be compared, and we call this axiom independence of the utilities of the dead. In addition, some other axioms were employed, including the strong Pareto principle which implies, in the framework considered here, that the individual lifetime utilities contain enough information to rank all possible states of the world. Applying Gorman's [10] result on overlapping sets of separable variables, the proof of which involves the solution of a generalized associativity equation (see Aczél [1], p. 310), we showed that the resulting social orderings are the critical-level generalizedutilitarian orderings, which were first introduced in Blackorby and Donaldson [6] . Critical-level generalized utilitarianism compares states of the world on the basis of the sum of the differences between the transformed utilities of those alive and a transformed critical level of lifetime utility. Critical-level utilitarianism is obtained in the special case where the transformation is the identity mapping. Applying a concave transformation generates inequality-averse orderings. The critical level is a parameter which represents an important ethical value judgement -adding, ceteris paribus, an individual with a lifetime utility equal to the critical level to an existing population leads to a state of the world that is indifferent to the original one. The critical level turns out to be independent of the utility levels and number of those alive in the state of the world under consideration, which isin addition to the additive separability of the criterion used for fixed-population comparisons -another important consequence of independence of the utilities of the dead.
Although the critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles have a strong ethical foundation (and our own position is that the strong Pareto principle should be respected), it is useful to explore the consequences of weakening strong Pareto in order to allow birth dates and lengths of life to matter in social evaluations. By considering those generalizations, we provide alternative social orderings that can be applied in circumstances where the strong Pareto principle is considered to be too restrictive in an intertemporal framework.
In Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [4], we examined the consequences of weakening strong Pareto to birth-date conditional strong Pareto. Together with independence of the utilities of the dead and other axioms, this condition leads to social orderings with a recursive structure and, with some additional axioms, orderings that are based on discounted utilities are obtained. In order to characterize geometric discounting in this framework, the solution to a Pexider equation (see Aczél [1], p. 141) resulting from a stationarity axiom is employed. See Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [4] for details.
In this paper, we provide an analysis that is dual to the one carried out in the above-described paper. Instead of birth-date conditional strong Pareto, we impose lifetime-conditional strong Pareto in order to allow for lengths of life to matter in establishing a social ordering. The main results of the paper provide
